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INTRODUCTION
When a transfer of property involves an accompanying con-
tract, principles of real property law and contract law seem to
come into conflict. In these situations, there is understandable
confusion as to which principle should prevail, particularly when
interpreting contract clauses that appear to restrain alienation of
the property in question. Such conflicts have been most visibly
debated in the courts when disputes have involved the interpreta-
tion of two types of clauses: due-on-sale clauses in mortgage
agreements' and clauses in lease contracts that require a
landlord's consent as a prerequisite to the alienation of a lease-
hold. Congress resolved the due-on-sale clause debate when it
passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
t I would like to thank Professor Richard C. Maxwell for his guidance and support
throughout the writing of this Note.
1. Due-on-sale clauses, sometimes called "acceleration clauses," allow a lender to
declare that when real property is sold, the mortgage note is due in full. In a market of
rising interest rates, then, a lender has two options when property so encumbered is
transferred. First, the lender may invoke the clause, requiring the seller to take out a
loan at the current market interest rate to pay off the mortgage note. Second, and more
commonly, the lender will waive the right to invoke the clause on the condition that the
buyer take over the mortgage under the current market rate of interest. Under either
scenario, the lender is able to benefit at the time of sale from a rise in interest rates,
and the seller whose mortgage agreement contains the due-on-sale clause cannot lock in
a low interest rate for a prospective buyer. (Note that in a market of declining interest
rates, a lender will not invoke the clause at the time of sale.) For a more in-depth dis-
cussion, see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 316
& n.3 (2d ed. 1985).
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(the Act),2 but the consent clause debate remains unresolved
among the state courts. That debate is the subject of this Note.
Resolution of the silent consent clause debate is not merely
an academic pursuit. The issue has been litigated in most of the
states over several decades,3 leaving an unsettled area of law.4 As
a result, leaseholders often do not know if or when they can sub-
let or assign their residential or commercial leases. More impor-
tant, landlords are still legally able to withhold consent to alien-
ation arbitrarily in the majority of jurisdictions,' although as this
Note argues, they should not be able to do so.
The debate involving consent clauses in leases focuses on
whether the concept of free alienability of real property should
overcome language, or a lack thereof, contained in the consent
clauses. Specifically, if a lease requires that a tenant obtain the
landlord's consent in order to sublet or assign, may the landlord
2. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The section of the Act relevant to this discussion is 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1988). Subject
to grace periods in some instances outlined in § 1701j-3(c), the Act allows lenders to
enforce due-on-sale clauses notwithstanding any laws that may have previously limited
such enforcement. Id. § 1701j-3(b)(1). The laws that the Act circumvents typically pre-
vent the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses unless the lender was acting "reasonably."
See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970, 976-77 (Cal. 1978) (en banc).
Although most property law issues are dealt with through state law mechanisms,
Congress was able to address the due-on-sale clause issue as part of its banking regula-
tion because most lenders enforcing mortgage clauses are banks. See generally NELSON &
WHrrMAN, supra note 1, at 332-37 (discussing the types of lenders, loans, and mortgage
transfers covered by the Act).
3. See, eg., Abrahamson v. Brett, 21 P.2d 229, 232 (Or. 1933); Zucker v. Dehm, 26
A.2d 564, 565 (NJ. 1942); Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher & Co., 88 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C.
1952); Segre v. Ring, 170 A.2d 265, 266 (N.H. 1961); Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v.
Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala. 1977); Funk v. Funk, 633 P.2d 586, 588-90 (Ida-
ho 1981).
4. See, e.g., Homa-Goff, 350 So. 2d at 1037 ("The general rule throughout the coun-
try has been that, when a lease contains an approval clause, the landlord may arbitrarily
and capriciously reject proposed subtenants. This rule, however, has been under steady
attack in several states in the past twenty years .... ") (citations omitted). The caselaw
is confusing both among the various states and sometimes even within one jurisdiction.
See infra Part IV.
5. "[W]here the question has been presented, a majority of the courts have held
that in a lease [containing a silent consent clause] the lessor ... may arbitrarily refuse
to accept a subtenant suitable and otherwise responsible . . . ." Gruman v. Investors Di-
versified Servs., Inc., 78 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Minn. 1956); see also Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 841 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) ("Nevertheless, a majority of juris-
dictions have long adhered to the rule that where a lease contains an approval
clause . . . . the lessor may arbitrarily refuse to approve a proposed assignee no matter
how suitable the assignee appears to be and no matter how unreasonable the lessor's
objection.").
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withhold consent arbitrarily, or may the tenant assume that con-
sent can be withheld only if the landlord is being reasonable?
Obviously, when the language of the lease explicitly requires rea-
sonableness, there is no debate. Many leases, however, contain
clauses, referred to in this Note as "silent consent clauses,"6 that
make no mention of reasonableness. The ultimate question in
these cases, then, is whether the tenant can rely on the general
notion that property is freely alienable unless a relevant contract
or statute dictates otherwise or, alternatively, whether the landlord
should be able to rely on the principle that a contract is what it
states itself to be and nothing more. In short, which law is domi-
nant, that of real property or that of contract? Although the states
have taken positions on both sides of this dichotomy,7 there really
is no need to decide which law should prevail; careful scrutiny of
these two areas of law and their underlying policies shows that
both require the invocation of the concept of reasonableness when
interpreting a lease's silent consent clause.
Because both due-on-sale clauses and silent consent clauses
involve contractual restrictions affecting real property transfers,
one might be tempted simply to refer to the law of due-on-sale
clauses as passed by Congress-allowing enforcement of such
clauses without regard to reasonableness-to solve the silent con-
sent clause problem, instead of attempting the tedious task of
reconciling two large areas of law. Close comparison of the two
types of clauses, however, shows that they are remarkably dissimi-
lar and thus require different treatment. Most importantly, al-
though due-on-sale clauses are not direct restraints on alienation,
silent consent clauses are.8 This Note thus does not rely on the
law of due-on-sale clauses but rather resolves the silent consent
clause debate by reconciling property and contract principles as
they relate to silent consent clauses.
Part I of this Note provides the historical background of the
tradition of free alienation of real property. In particular, this Part
focuses on leases and the current debate over consent clauses. Part
II explains why courts cannot look to the law of due-on-sale claus-
es for an answer to the silent consent clause question and then
demonstrates that the laws and policies of both real property and
6. See Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1990).
7. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Section nI(A).
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contract support the reading of reasonableness into a lease's silent
consent clause. In Part III, reasonableness in the context of lease
contracts is defined. Finally, in Part IV, the decisions of two courts
are used to illustrate the confused state of the law in this area and
why it needs to be clarified and made more uniform.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Freedom of Alienation
At the heart of the silent consent clause debate is the argu-
ment by tenants that property should be freely alienable and that
landlords thus should not be able to refuse consent to alienation
arbitrarily. Common law history, in that it shows a trend toward
ever-increasing freedom of alienation, supports such an argument;
as noted legal scholar John Chipman Gray once stated, "The
current of law has for centuries been in favor of removing old
restraints on alienation [and] in favor of disallowing new ones. '
The concept of freedom of alienation as it is recognized in
the United States has its roots in the English common law. Begin-
ning in 1066, after William the Conqueror invaded England, real
property came to be held under the feudal system of landhold-
ing.'" The king, who was the ultimate landowner, allowed a few
lords to possess large parcels of land. These lords in turn divided
their holdings among tenants of their own, and the process contin-
ued down to the lowest rung of the possessory ladder, which was
occupied by serfs, called villeins, who worked the land. All levels
of tenants owed their lords both services, such as rent or knights
for battle, and incidents, some of which directly hindered free
alienation of the land." For example, if a tenant wished to inher-
it land from his father 12 or to convey it to someone else,13 he
9. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY § 4
(Boston, Boston Book Co. 2d ed. 1895).
10. See generally CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY ch. 1 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing medieval English land law after the Norman
Conquest); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.2-1.5 (A. James Casner et al. eds.,
1952) (same).
11. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, ch. 1, §§ 5, 8; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 10, § 1.4.
12. In the early part of the Middle Ages, land could pass at death only through
inheritance, not through a will. Subject to a surviving spouse's dower or curtesy, the land
passed through primogeniture to the eldest son of the landowner. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 1.5; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the
[Vol. 43:671
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had to pay for the privilege.'4 If he died without heirs, the pos-
session of his land would revert to his lord. 5
As one might suppose, such a system, which kept the bulk of
the kingdom's wealth in the hands of the king and a few powerful
lords, was a source of discontent to many of the subjects of the
realm. Over hundreds of years, legal changes, only some of which
were intentionally reformatory, increased landholders' ability to
alienate land freely and mollified this discontent. An early reform
came about through the passage of the Statute Quia Emptores. 6
This law was not passed for the welfare of lowly tenants; rather, it
was meant to keep the money from incidents going to the king.
The king was losing revenue normally provided by incidents be-
cause of the practice of subinfeudation; the Statute Quia
Emptores eliminated this practice by prohibiting the creation of
new tenures. With substitution as the only remaining way to make
an inter vivos transfer of real property, the incidents owed to a
lord survived intact after all property transfers. To pass the new
law, however, the lords had to allow land transfer by substitution
without a requirement that the tenant first obtain the lord's con-
sent. In addition, tenants no longer had to pay lords (except for
the king) fintes for these transfers. 8 The Statute Quia Emptores
Law of the Dead" Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 340, 360-65.
13. There were two ways to make an inter vivos transfer of land in feudal England.
The first involved substitution, whereby one tenant transferred possession of his land to
another tenant, leaving all services and incidents due to the lord intact but making them
the responsibility of the new tenant. Before the tenant made the transfer, he had to
secure his lord's consent, and the substituting tenant had to pledge homage to his new
lord. The second method was subinfeudation, a land conveyance through which one ten-
ant conveyed land in such a way that he himself became a mesne lord, taking the trans-
feree as his own tenant. This process, which did not require consent, often denied the
conveying tenant's lord the original value of his incidents. For example, if the new mesne
lord required of his new tenant only a nominal service such as rent of one peppercorn a
year, and the mesne lord died without heirs, the lord remaining would lose the value of
the mesne lord's services and receive only the yearly peppercorn rent in services. The
incident of escheat, through which the lord would have recovered possession of the land
formerly in the mesne lord's possession, would not come into play beyond the pepper-
corn rent because of the presence of the new tenant. For a fuller explanation of these
types of land transfers, see MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, ch. 1, § 8; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 1.5.
14. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, ch. 1, § 7.
15. Id.
16. 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1290) (Eng.). "Quia Emptores" means "because purchasers."
These are the first two words of the statute in Latin. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, ch. 1, §
8, n.1.
17. See supra note 13.
18. See JESsE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 152-53 (2d ed. 1988);
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was thus a milestone in the common law in its promotion of free-
dom of alienation. This trend toward free alienation continued
with the passage of such laws as the Statute of Wills in 154019
and the Tenures Abolition Act in 1660.20
The United States also has recognized the concept of freedom
of alienation over the past two hundred years. All of the states
except Pennsylvania and South Carolina adopted the Statute Quia
Emptores,2' and even the U.S. Supreme Court has noted the im-
portance of the freedom to alienate property.' American courts
continue to discourage restraints on alienation today,' although
there are a few situations in which a restraint may be valid, e.g., if
it is only a partial restraint24 or if the restraint is in the form of
a covenant in a contract that governs an ongoing relationship be-
tween transferor and transferee, namely, when the restraint is part
of a lease.'
B. The Leasehold Estate
Throughout their common law existence, leaseholds have had
a hybrid legal identity, characterized by their requirement of a
contract that dictates the terms of the landlord-tenant relationship.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, ch. 1, § 8; 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10,
§ 1.5.
19. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540) (Eng.) (allowing conveyance of real property through
wills, thus eliminating forced primogeniture); see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 10, § 1.5.
20. 12 Car. 2, ch. 24 (1660) (Eng.) (abolishing, inter alia, fines for alienation of land
held of the king); see GRAY, supra note 9, § 4.
21. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 1.41.
22. See, eg., Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U.S. 353, 363 (1898) (noting "the general rule of
law which discourages all restraints upon alienation").
23. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (contrasting
property law with the law governing international arms sales and noting that "[p]roperty
law disfavors restraints on alienation"); Funk v. Funk, 633 P.2d 586, 589 (Idaho 1981)
(noting that restraints on alienation are disfavored and, in the case of leases, are con-
strued against the lessor); cf. Godley v. Kentucky Resources Corp., 640 F.2d 831, 836
(6th Cir. 1981) ("While restraints on the alienation of property interests are looked on
with disfavor, they may nonetheless be upheld when not repugnant to a plain provision
of law and not unreasonable.") (emphasis added).
24. A particularly common form of accepted partial restraint is one that restricts the
use of the property transferred. See, e.g., Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 64
Cal. Rptr. 816 (Ct. App. 1967) (restricting property to lodge -use only).
25. See, eg., McFadden-Deauville Hotel, Inc. v. Murrell, 182 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir.
1950) (acknowledging that assignability is determined by provisions in lease); Julian v.
Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1990) ("Contractual restrictions on the alienability of
leasehold interests are permitted.").
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As a result, the law has not treated these estates in quite the
same way as other real property estates.
In the Middle Ages, when a landowner needed money, he
would offer land to a moneylender for a term of years in ex-
change for a cash consideration. The lender would expect to be
able to recover his outlay and more from the use of the land
during the term of the lease.26 Such landholdings were classified
as nonfreehold estates and were considered by the courts to be
personal property instead of real property.2 Therefore, if a ten-
ant was dispossessed of his title by someone other than his land-
lord, his only remedy was money damages.' Eventually, the
courts classified these estates as chattels real29 because they were
personal property in the form of real estate." In the late fif-
teenth century, tenants were finally given the right of specific
recovery against anyone who had wrongfully dispossessed them of
their title.31
Today, at least some American courts still consider leases to
be chattels real 2 In addition, because leases also still involve
contractual relationships between landlords and tenants, they are
subject to both the laws of real property and the laws of con-
26. This system of lending money arose because lenders needed a way around the
strict usury laws imposed at the time by the Church. See MOYNHAN, supra note 10, ch.
3, § 1; A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 71-72 (2d ed. 1986); 1 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 3.1.
27. See MoYNHAN, supra note 10, ch. 3, § 1.
28. See id. A tenant could recover possession against a landlord who wrongfully
dispossessed him of his property. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, §
3.1.
29. The definition of "chattel real" is somewhat confusing and not always uniform
among the courts. See, eg., Ex Parte Nottingham, 522 So. 2d 777, 778 (Ala. 1988) (hold-
ing that a lease, a chattel real, is personal property for venue purposes); Western Say. &
Loan Ass'n V. CFS Portales Ethanol I, Ltd., 754 P.2d 520, 521 (N.M. 1988) (classifying a
lease as a chattel and therefore not real property). But see Aye v. Fix, 580 P.2d 97, 99
(Mont. 1978) (defining "chattel real" as an interest in real estate and, as such, not per-
sonal property). Despite the confusion as to what a chattel real actually is, leases are
generally considered to be subject to the dictates of the concept of free alienation, a real
property concept. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
30. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, ch. 3, § 1; SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 76.
31. Through a bit of misconstruction of the action of eiectio ftrmae, a trespass action
for damages, tenants gained the right to specific recovery of their land. This cause of
action became popular with landowners as well, who heretofore had been required to
make more cumbersome claims sounding in real property, and it eventually became
known as the more familiar claim of ejectment. See SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 74-76,
92-93; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 3.1.
32. See supra note 29.
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tract.33 Thus, there arises a tension between the concept of free
alienation of property and the accepted practice of allowing con-
tracting parties to make contractual covenants that may restrict
this freedom.' This tension has given rise to the current debate
over silent consent clauses, and, predictably, states have divided
for the most part along property law and contract law lines. The
majority of state courts hold that a silent consent clause should be
interpreted strictly for what it says-i.e., when there is no mention
of reasonableness in a clause that requires a landlord's consent for
subletting or assigning, reasonableness should not be required.35
The minority of states, mostly through caselaw, but in a few in-
stances by statute, read reasonableness into silent consent clauses
on the theory that otherwise, the lease imposes an invalid restraint
on alienation.36
33. One court noted that
[t]he instrument of lease is thus both an executory contract and a present con-
veyance, creating between the parties both privity of contract and of estate.
Therefore, the obligations which the parties bear to each other may arise out of
contract or from the real covenants of the leasehold estate, or sometimes from
both.
Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips of Fairfax, Inc. v. Chillum Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 327
A.2d 282, 286 (Md. 1974) (citations omitted); see also 1 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 10, § 3.11.
34. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. There are three categories of direct
restraints: disabling restraints, which make any attempt at alienation void; forfeiture re-
straints, which allow for the divestiture of the property from the original transferee at
the option of the original transferor if an attempt at alienation by the original transferee
is made under specified circumstances; and promissory restraints, which are covenants
disallowing alienation to which the parties to a contract have agreed. Consent clauses in
leases are promissory restraints in that they are part of a contract; they also may be
considered to be forfeiture restraints if as a consequence of an attempt to alienate with-
out consent, the tenant loses possession of the property. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY §§ 3.1-3.3 (1983); id. § 15.2 cmts. b-d (1977); 2 LEWIS M. SIMES, THE LAW
OF FUTU]RE INTERESTS § 441 (1936).
35. See, eg., Slavin v. Rent Control Bd., 548 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (Mass. 1990) (rent
control residential lease); Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 78 N.W.2d 377,
381 (Minn. 1956) (commercial lease); Segre v. Ring, 170 A.2d 265, 266 (N.H. 1961) (re-
sort town residential lease); F & L Ctr. Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 482
N.E.2d 1296, 1300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (commercial lease); Abrahamson v. Brett, 21
P.2d 229, 232 (Or. 1933) (residential lease); B & R Oil Co. v. Ray's Mobile Homes, Inc.,
422 A.2d 1267, 1267 (Vt. 1980) (commercial lease).
36. See eg., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1990) (residential lease); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, § 5512(b) (1989) (residential and commercial leases); HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-63
(1988) (lease assignments); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney 1989) (residential
lease); Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977) (commer-
cial lease); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 849 (Cal. 1985) (en banc)
(same); Jack Frost Sales, Inc. v. Harris Trust and Say. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982) (same); Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1990) (same);
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II. READING REASONABLENESS INTO SILENT CONSENT CLAUSES
A. Dispensing with the Due-on-Sale Clause Analogy
Although contract and property law concepts relevant to leas-
es are reconcilable, this arduous process would not be necessary in
the silent consent clause context if courts could simply look to the
law of due-on-sale clauses to resolve the debate. Unfortunately,
due-on-sale clauses and silent consent clauses are alike only in
that they both have an effect on real property transfers through a
contract clause, one in a mortgage and the other in a lease. If one
looks beyond this superficial similarity, it is apparent that the
former is not a restraint on alienation, whereas the latter is, and
that the former is clear as to its operation, whereas the latter is
not. Therefore, the law should not treat the two clauses in the
same manner.
Prior to the passage of the Gan-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act,37 some courts argued that due-on-sale clauses
should be enforced only if reasonable, saying that such clauses
hindered the ability to sell and thus were restraints on alienation
that should be enforced sparingly. These courts reasoned that a
due-on-sale clause and its accompanying threat of higher interest
rates on the prospective buyer's loan either would inhibit the
seller's chance of actually finding a buyer or would force the seller
to lower the selling price to compensate for the higher rates of
interest the buyer would have to pay.8 Other courts argued cor-
rectly that a due-on-sale clause does not itself hinder the sale of
property in any way but only describes a financial consequence of
transfer. If the seller has difficulty selling because interest rates
are rising, the problem with selling is due to the economic condi-
Kruger v. Page Management Co., 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (residential sub-
lease, interpreting New York statute).
Some of these minority courts also cite the contract law requirement of good faith
and fair dealing in support of the requirement of reasonableness. Such arguments are a
nascent form of reconciliation of the relevant property and contract law concepts, but
apparently they have not been as complete or as convincing as they need to be to win
the support of the majority of states. See, eg., Kendall, 709 P.2d at 844-45; Julian, 575
A.2d at 738-39.
37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970, 974-75 (Cal. 1978) (en
banc); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 816-18 (Tex. 1982)
(Spears, J., concurring).
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tions of the time, not to the due-on-sale clause in the seller's
mortgage agreement.39 Due-on-sale clauses thus are not restraints
on alienation.
Silent consent clauses, on the other hand, can dictate whether
a tenant can make a sublease or assignment at all. If the landlord
refuses to consent to a sublease or assignment, the tenant's hold-
ing is rendered completely inalienable. The consent clause thus
serves as a direct restraint on alienation.'
Also, in contrast to silent consent clauses, due-on-sale clauses
are clear on their face as to their operation: if a transfer of prop-
erty is made, the lender may invoke the clause.41 Silent consent
clauses are not quite so clear. They state that if a transfer is made
without consent, the landlord may invoke the clause.42 The unem-
bellished "without consent" phrase leaves the tenant uncertain as
to when consent may be withheld and thus as to whether the
clause will be invoked. When consent clauses dictate that consent
cannot be withheld unreasonably, the tenant knows where he
stands. Unfortunately, silent consent clauses contain no such lan-
guage. Since each state varies in its treatment of such clauses,
tenants cannot always know whether reasonableness will be read
into the clause.43
39. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 926 (4th Cir. 1981);
Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d at 977-79 (Clark, J., dissenting); Medevoi v. American Say. and
Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 583 n.1 (Ct. App. 1979); Occidental Say. and Loan Ass'n
v. Venco Partnership, 293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Neb. 1980); see also Richard C. Maxwell,
The Due-on-Sale Clause: Restraints on Alienation and Adhesion Theory in California, 28
UCLA L. REV. 197, 200 (1980).
This point is made clearer by the observation that a buyer of completely unencum-
bered property also is faced with the prospect of paying current interest rates if a mort-
gage note is agreed to at the time of purchase.
40. See supra note 34.
41. Due-on-sale clauses typically take the form of the clause that was at issue in
Wellenkamp, which stated that if the trustor "sells, conveys, alienates . . . said proper-
ty... or becomes divested of [his] title or any interest therein ... in any manner or
way, . . . Beneficiary shall have the right at its option, to declare said note . . . secured
hereby . . . immediately due and payable without notice." Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d at 972.
42. Silent consent clauses tend to be brief and of the following general form: a les-
see may not "assign this lease nor underlet said premises, or any part thereof, without
the consent of Lessor in writing." Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 78 N.W.2d
377, 378 (Minn. 1956).
43. Not only are there inconsistencies among the states, see supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text, but there also may be inconsistency within a particular jurisdiction.
See infra Part IV.
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Because of these fundamental differences between the two
types of clauses, the analyses of due-on-sale clauses made by the
courts and Congress are not particularly helpful in the determina-
tion of how consent clauses in leases should be treated. The sec-
ond approach to the silent consent clause problem, the reconcilia-
tion of seemingly competing contract and property law concepts, is
accordingly necessary.
B. Justifications for the Invocation of Reasonableness Based on
Real Property Law Policy
During the Middle Ages, landholders justified the need for
free alienation of land by pointing out that without laws promot-
ing alienation, the king and his powerful lords would control most
of the land in England and. the wealth that came with it. Al-
though the United States is not subject to such a repressive feudal
scheme, numerous public policies continue to support tenants'
views that property should be freely alienable.
Society is affected in several ways when property is rendered
inalienable. Tenants are obviously affected. If a tenant is unable to
alienate because of the denial of consent to sublet or assign, im-
mobility is a probable consequence. This result occurs whether the
lease is residential or commercial. If, for example, a person has
the opportunity to take a new job but must move to do so, prohi-
bition against subletting or assigning his residence limits his op-
tions. Of course, the tenant can always break his lease, but then
he will suffer the consequences inherent in such action, such as
having to continue to pay rent for the remainder of his lease
term.4 For many people, the requirement of paying two rents for
44. See supra Section I(A).
45. Some leases are admittedly lenient with regard to residential tenants who need to
move because of an employer's decision. Such leases contain clauses allowing for month-
to-month rental after some initial rental period; in these cases, only 30 days' notice is
needed to cancel a lease. Other leases contain clauses, such as the following, regarding
moves for employment reasons: "You may terminate this Lease after the first 180 days
of the term if your present employer transfers You outside a fifty (50) mile radius from
the Community provided You [give 30 days' notice, proof of transfer, leave the premises
in good condition, pay all sums due, and comply with the other terms of the lease]."
Although lenient in certain circumstances, however, these clauses do not help the
person who is changing from one job to another, who is starting a new job, or who has
not occupied his apartment for the requisite amount of time. In such situations, the ten-
ant breaking the lease may be required by even the most generous leases to pay several
months' rent, surrender the security deposit, and pay costs incurred in attempting to re-
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several months is a burden not easily overcome and may prevent
any move at all, thereby harming both the tenant and his potential
employer and profession. In the commercial setting, the scenario is
similar, although consequences may vary among commercial ten-
ants depending on their size and stability. Arguably, the most
likely to be hurt are small businesses that need to move to take
advantage of a larger space or a more desirable location. Especial-
ly in the case of a small business lacking excess capital, the law
would seem terribly harsh if it encouraged the use of lease clauses
that kept such an entity from improving its financial position
through an otherwise feasible relocation. In either residential or
commercial lease situations, the tenant who is restricted from
subletting or assigning and who is unable to afford the conse-
quences of breaking a lease will be restrained from increasing his
wealth, enlarging his business, or otherwise improving his lifestyle.
Beyond the concerns of tenants themselves are those of the
community as a whole. From an altruistic viewpoint, the communi-
ty should be concerned when the human potential of a tenant is
wasted to some extent because he cannot improve his lot in life
due to lease restrictions. From a more selfish viewpoint, one
would expect the community to want its tenants to be in the best
financial condition possible; the more money tenants have to
spend, the better off financially the community will be. A tenant
who, due to a slow rental market, cannot afford the costs associat-
ed with breaking his lease not only misses the opportunity to
improve his personal financial situation but also is unable to use
the increased buying power that might have come with his move.
rent the apartment. A typical clause may read as follows:
If for any reason other than those set forth . . .above [relating to moves
required by an employer] You desire to terminate this Lease agreement prior
to the designated ending date, You shall give Us thirty (30) days written notice
and You will be charged a set termination fee equivalent to two (2) month's
[sic] rent as stated on your current Lease agreement. In addition, Your deposit
will be held to cover all costs involved in preparing the apartment for a new
tenant, as well as those costs We incur attempting to re-rent Your apartment.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.1 (1977).
A landlord also may be injured if a tenant cannot alienate. If the lease calls for
forfeiture on improper alienation, the landlord is without an occupant; if the tenant sur-
renders the lease, the landlord may be required by law to mitigate damages. See, e.g.,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.29 (West 1981); McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 593 A.2d 309,
314 (NJ. 1991) (applying the requirement of mitigation to commercial, as well as residen-
tial, lessors); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1989) (requir-
ing landlord to take "commercially reasonable" steps to mitigate damages).
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Similarly, in a strong rental market, a tenant who is restrained
from subletting and thereby prevented from taking advantage of
increasing rental rates is unable to consume the proceeds from the
sublease.6 Even if, under the restraints imposed by a consent
clause denial, the tenant can meet the financial burdens that ac-
company breaking a lease,47" the landlord then must find a new
tenant, and until a new tenant is found, the property will lie emp-
ty. The empty rental property could then be a target for vandal-
ism and, in any event, would not have a resident to keep it from
falling into disrepair.4
Restraints also discourage improvement of property. Admit-
tedly, in the case of a residential lease, a landlord may have good
reason not to allow changes to the property because the space is
already adapted to residential living.49 In commercial settings,
however, especially when changes are minimally destructive or
modernize the property, a landlord may allow the tenant to
change decor, add machinery, or change the property in some
other way to make it more useful than when it was first rented.50
If the tenant knows that he may then sublet or assign if necessary
or advantageous, he is more likely to make improvements that will
aid the completion of such a transfer. If, however, the tenant
believes that he will not be able to benefit financially from any
improvements he makes, he will have little incentive to make
more than the bare minimum of improvements needed to run his
business.5' The law should encourage the making of such im-
provements because property that has been improved to meet the
46. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 263.
47. See supra note 45.
48. When the property is likely to stand idle for a substantial length of time, the
landlord could probably save himself some trouble if he allowed the tenant to sublet or
assign because then he would not have to search for a new tenant himself.
49. The following is a typical provision under which a landlord could refuse to allow
changes: "[Tihe LESSEE[,] for himself and his assigns, hereby COVENANTS with the les-
sor... that he and his executors, administrators, and assigns ... will not, without the
consent in writing of the lessor,... make or suffer any alterations or additions in or to
the [premises]." URIEL H. CROCKER, NOTES ON COMMON FORMS 271-72 (Guy Newhall
ed., 5th ed. 1913); see also ALIviN L. ARNOLD ET AL., MODERN REAL ESTATE AND
MORTGAGE FORMS, Form 90.2, at 11-197 (3d ed. 1986).
50. A commercial lease might read as follows: "Tenant will not paint the Premises
or make or permit anyone to make any alterations in or additions thereto ... without
the prior written consent of Landlord." ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 49, Form 45.1, at
11-19.
51. See 6 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 263.
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demands of new technologies or changing consumer tastes is likely
to be used more efficiently and continually than property that is
allowed to become out-of-date or unattractive.
Although the foregoing arguments support tenants' views that
leased property should be freely alienable, there are two sides to
the story; tenants would obviously prefer unrestricted free alien-
ability, but landlords also have rights. Thus, one could argue that
landlords should have the right to refuse consent for any (or no)
reason; because leases are by definition not of indefinite duration,
any restraint on alienation is only temporary.52 This position is
untenable for several reasons. First, any prospective tenant who is
trying to move into a particular property by way of a sublease or
assignment is not likely to wait for the end of a lease term to do
so. Therefore, the issues of mobility and idleness are still at hand.
Second, many lease terms are not all that short, 3 so "temporary"
takes on a relative meaning. With respect to the age of the uni-
verse, a ten-year lease covers a short span of time, but with re-
spect to a person's lifetime or a business cycle, ten years may
seem closer to an eternity.
There are, however, several public policies that support a
landlord's right to refuse consent to a proposed sublease or assign-
ment if such consent is withheld reasonably. One such argument is
that two parties should be allowed to make a contract limiting
their rights as they so choose.' A second argument espoused by
52. See, eg., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d
710, 719 (Cal. 1992) (noting that lease restraints, by definition, are limited by the dura-
tion of the lease).
One also could argue that a landlord has the right to refuse consent to alienate for
purely discriminatory reasons because landlords are not state actors and are thus not
subject to constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the many civil
rights laws prohibiting discrimination, however, especially in the area of housing, the idea
that public policy would support outright discrimination in leasing situations is laughable.
Public policy does not support the right to discriminate; the laws simply do not prohibit
discrimination in every private situation imaginable. Se4 e.g., The Fair Housing Act 42
U.S.C. § 3604 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin); The Civil Rights Act of 1866
id. § 1982 (prohibiting racial discrimination in the housing context). But see id. § 3603(b)
(exempting from the prohibitions of the Fair Housing Act owners who rent in certain
residential situations). Individual states also may have more protective laws.
53. Commercial leases often run for five or ten years, see, e.g., Johnson v. Jaquith,
189 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (five years); Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel
Martinique Assocs., 190 N.E.2d 10 (N.Y. 1963) (ten years), but may be for much longer
terms, see, eg., Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church v. Oliver-Tyrone Corp., 375
A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (999 years).
54. See Drake v. Eggleston, 108 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1952) (noting that
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lessors has to do with a landlord's ability to protect his invest-
ment. As many courts and commentators have pointed out, a
landlord has theoretically chosen his tenant with care and should
not be forced to accept an unsuitable tenant should the original
tenant choose to sublet or assign to such a person or entity 5 On
the other hand, as discussed above, a tenant should not be denied
the ability to alienate. A compromise position that allows a tenant
and his landlord to discuss and agree on the new tenant would
seem to be the best option.56 In this way, both parties' fights
with respect to alienation are honored.
C. Justifications for the Invocation of Reasonableness Based on
the Rules of Contract Interpretation
In addition to the right of a landlord to protect his property
investment, there also exists the freedom to contract. As a matter
of practice, courts allow landlords and tenants to bargain for re-
strictions on alienation of the subject property." One might be-
lieve, then, that the majority of states, which hold that a landlord's
refusal to give consent to sublet or assign may be arbitrary and
capficious,' 8 are correct. This belief that the silent consent clause
gives all power to the landlord is flawed, however, because the
rules of contract interpretation dictate that more than the wording
of one clause should be examined when determining the meaning
although courts do not look favorably on restraints on alienation, covenants may be used
to restrict subletting); Kruger v. Page Management Co., 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 300 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (noting that a lease is a contract and that the parties to it are free to agree to
anything they want, absent violation of law or public policy). For a discussion of this
contract argument, see infra Section 1(C).
55. See, eg., Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844 (Cal. 1985) (en bane)
(citing authorities that allow a landlord to protect his investment); Jack Frost Sales v.
Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (requiring the tender
of a suitable sublessee as a condition precedent to the lessor's duty to consent to the
sublease); SIMES, supra note 34, § 470.
56. This compromise position advocating reasonableness, although adopted by only a
minority of states, has been adopted by the Restatement of Property and in England. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATVE TRANSFERS) §§ 4.1(2), 4.2(3) (1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 15.2 (1977); Land-
lord and Tenant Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § 19(1) (Eng.).
57. See, eg., McFadden-Deauville Hotel, Inc. v. Murrell, 182 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir.
1950); Drake, 108 N.E.2d at 69; Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1990);
Kruger, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
58. See, e.g., Kendall, 709 P.2d at 841; Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc.,
78 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Minn. 1956).
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of an ambiguous contract term, especially when it is clear that the
parties to the lease have not engaged in any actual "bargaining."
Because silent consent clauses fall into this category of ambiguous
contract clauses, 9 these rules of interpretation should be exam-
ined carefully when determining whether a silent consent clause
should incorporate the idea of reasonableness even when that
concept is unstated. 60
The essence of contract interpretation lies in determining what
each party has bargained for or, in other words, what the intent of
each party was at the time the contract was made.61 With regard
to the interpretation of a lease's silent consent clause, courts
should examine the language of the clause, the issue of reliance,
the relative bargaining power of the parties, and the parties' good
faith.
With respect to a silent consent clause standing alone, the
wording 62 is unclear on its face.' There may be other language,
however, that a court could examine to clarify the clause. If a
contract contains explanatory terms providing that consent may
not be withheld unreasonably or, conversely, that consent may be
withheld for any reason, then there is no interpretive problem
59. The majority of courts interpret a silent consent clause to mean that the landlord
may withhold consent without giving any reason whatsoever. On the other hand, a clause
that merely states a need for consent of a landlord hardly qualifies as a "clear and un-
ambiguous" statement, Gruman, 78 N.WV.2d at 381, of both parties' intentions that the
landlord may prevent alienation for a reason as arbitrary as that he is in a bad mood on
any given day. It is thus also feasible that one might interpret a silent consent clause to
mean that any landlord withholding consent must have a valid reason for doing so. As a
Massachusetts court noted over fifty years ago, "It would seem to be the better law that
when a lease restricts a lessee's rights by requiring consent before these rights can be
exercised, it must have been in the contemplation of the parties that the lessor be re-
quired to give some reason for withholding consent." Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D. Mass. 1940); see also Julian, 575 A.2d at
738 ("If a landlord is allowed to arbitrarily refuse consent to an assignment or sublease,
for what in effect is no reason at all, that would virtually nullify any right to assign or
sublease.").
60. The fact that a lease is a real estate contract does not take it out of the realm
of traditional contract interpretation. See, eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.) (concluding that "leases of urban dwelling units should be inter-
preted and construed like any other contract"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
61. A contract is "a promise or set of promises," RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACrs § 1 (1981), and "a promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way." Id. § 2.
62. For the language of a typical silent consent clause, see supra note 42.
63. See supra note 59.
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with the consent clause. In these cases, however, the consent
clause could hardly be said to be "silent." 64
Because the language of a truly "silent" consent clause is not
necessarily indicative of the true intent of both landlord and ten-
ant, other interpretive devices should be used to uncover this
intent. One such device is the analysis of any reliance by either
the landlord or the tenant. One could argue that a landlord who
relied on the "without consent" language of a silent consent clause
was justified in thinking that all control of alienation was in his
hands. This conclusion would imply, however, that the landlord
actually believed a tenant would agree to such a construction of
this term. Courts that allow the withholding of consent for abso-
lutely no reason when a silent consent clause is involved' walk
among the willfully blind, ignoring the reality that "[m]ost tenants
probably would not understand that a clause stating 'this lease
may not be assigned or sublet without the landlord's written
consent' means the same as a clause stating 'the tenant shall have
no right to assign or sublease.' ""
A tenant's reliance on freedom of alienation is more justified.
In the case of the unsophisticated residential tenant, it seems fair
to say that many people are aware of someone who has sublet his
college apartment for the summer or assigned the remainder of his
lease after graduation and believe that they can do the same. On
a more esoteric level, lawyers for both sides who negotiate more
complicated commercial leases should have some knowledge of the
long history of property law innovations supporting free alienation,
not to mention awareness of modem caselaw and statutory law,
which provide for free alienation unless it is otherwise expressly
forbidden.67 Therefore, the tenant's expectation of at least a mo-
64. When the lease truly is silent and does not clarify when a landlord may withhold
consent, the only other language to which a court might look for guidance would be
parol evidence. If a court does have access to relevant parol evidence, this evidence may
well resolve any questions of intent concerning the consent clause. Since cases in which
intent is clear are not the subject of this Note, however, situations in which admissible
parol evidence is available are not considered.
65. See, e.g., Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 190 N.E.d 10, 11
(N.Y. 1963) (holding that in New York, it is settled law that unless a lease consent
clause expressly requires reasonableness, arbitrary refusal of consent is permissible).
66. Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1990).
67. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5512(a) (1989) (stating that unless otherwise
agreed, a tenant may sublet or assign); Julian, 575 A.2d at 738 (citing ROBERT S.
SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.6 (1980) and 1 AMERI-
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dicum of freedom to sublet or assign is much more justified than
a landlord's reliance on the notion that he may withhold consent
for no reason at all.
The issue of the relative bargaining power of the parties is
closely related to the reliance issue in that it also has to do with
each party's level of sophistication. When both parties are equally
sophisticated or represented by counsel, as is often the case when
a long-term commercial lease is being negotiated, the bargaining
power of each party may not be an issue. When the tenant is less
sophisticated than the landlord,' however, as is true in some
commercial and many residential leasing situations, courts should
make a determination of the effect the tenant's position may have
on his beliefs about the lease and his intentions at the time the
lease was signed. The tenant who is unsophisticated is not likely
to think to ask about an alienation clause that appears to require
only that the tenant ask permission before subletting or assigning.
Further, since a residential lease contract could arguably be con-
sidered to be a contract of adhesion,69 a tenant might not even
understand the language used in the consent clause." Recogniz-
ing that the boiler-plate language used in such contracts is hard
for a non-lawyer to understand, courts have traditionally construed
clauses in adhesion contracts in favor of the less sophisticated
party.71 Even if a court does not consider the lease tantamount
to an adhesion contract, it is still common practice to construe am-
biguous language against the party in whose favor the benefit of
the clause accrues.' When there is a silent consent clause dispute
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 3.56); Kruger v. Page Management Co., 432
N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that under the common law of New York, a
tenant may alienate at will if there is no express restriction in either contract or statute).
68. Obviously, there could theoretically be occasions when the landlord is less so-
phisticated than the tenant. The court would need to take this switching of roles into ac-
count if it arose.
69. As Professor Maxwell has noted, "adhesion contract" has been defined as "a
standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to the transaction ...under such
conditions that the 'adherer' cannot obtain the desired product or service save by acqui-
escing in the form agreement." Maxwell, supra note 39, at 209 (quoting Steven v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (Cal. 1962)).
70. Although most people probably understand the concept of subletting, it is not
unimaginable that they would not understand the words "underletting" or "assigning."
71. See, eg., Steven, 377 P.2d at 294-98 (approving construction in favor of less so-
phisticated party in cases involving adhesion contracts).
72. This practice holds true regarding all types of contracts, not just leases. See, e.g.,
Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D. Mass.
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between a landlord and his less sophisticated tenant, then, the
clause should be construed in favor of the tenant, i.e., in favor of
preventing the unreasonable withholding of consent.
One final argument based on contract interpretation theory
that supports the reading of reasonableness into silent consent
clauses is the concept of "good faith and fair dealing."'73 Several
courts, borrowing a standard from the Uniform Commercial Code,
have advanced the idea that the good-faith doctrine requires that
a standard of "commercial reasonableness" be read into silent
consent clauses.74 Even if one does not agree that standards
adopted for use in governing the sale of goods apply to leasing
transactions, the doctrine as it is set forth in the Restatement of
Contracts is still relevant to the silent consent clause issue: if a
landlord knows that a tenant is not likely to understand the impli-
cations of the landlord's interpretation of a silent consent clause,
he could hardly be considered to be acting in good faith if he fails
to explain the clause until after the tenant announces plans to
sublet or assign.
Once a court has determined that a consent clause stands
alone and unclarified in a given lease contract, analysis of the
lease through the use of standard contract interpretation methods
will point to favoring the tenant over the landlord in consent
clause disputes. In these situations, contract law, like the policies
favoring free alienation of property, supports the reading of a
requirement of reasonableness into silent consent clauses.
1940) (holding that a covenant calling for consent of landlord prior to assignment by
tenant is for the landlord's benefit and should be construed in favor of tenant); Great
Am. Mut. Indemn. Co. v. Jones, 144 N.E. 596, 596 (Ohio 1924) (holding that insurance
policies should be construed like any other contract and that policies subject to more
than one interpretation should be construed in favor of the insured) (quoting Mumaw v.
Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 119 N.E. 132, 132 (Ohio 1917)); VNB Mortgage Corp. v.
Lone Star Indus., Inc., 209 S.E.2d 909, 913 (Va. 1974) (holding that with respect to a
mechanic's lien, ambiguous contract provisions should be construed against the party for
whose benefit the clauses were inserted).
73. This concept is embodied in the Restatement of Contracts: "Every contract impos-
es upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its en-
forcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 205 (1981).
74. See Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844-45 (Cal. 1985) (en banc);
see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1991) (imposing duty of good faith and fair dealing); id. §
2-103(b) (defining good faith under Article 2 as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards").
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III. DEFINING "REASONABLE"
Having determined that the policies supporting free alienation
of property and the rules governing contract interpretation both
require that reasonableness be read into silent consent clauses,
there remains the task of defining what is included in the concept
of reasonableness. Courts that require reasonableness often clarify
the term, but they usually do so only with respect to a proposed
replacement tenant.' Seldom discussed, but just as important, is
the consideration of whether it is reasonable for a landlord to
withhold consent when a tenant wants to alienate so that the
tenant can take advantage of rising rental rates.76 By balancing
the justification for the restraint against the policies that support
free alienation, this Part sets out general guidelines concerning
what are reasonable justifications for a landlord's withholding of
consent.
The first part of the balancing test concerns arguments sup-
porting the restraint. As discussed above.7 there are really only
two such arguments that survive scrutiny. One, the argument that
as a contract, a lease should be taken at face value when its terms
are clear, is valid only when the clause is not actually "silent" but
instead is accompanied by clarifying terms within the contract.78
When this clarifying language is present, any withholding of con-
sent that does not otherwise violate the law79 is inherently rea-
75. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jaquith, 189 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (de-
claring plaintiff's withholding of consent reasonable because, inter alia, it was based on
the financial status of defendant); Jack Frost Sales v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 433
N.E.2d 941, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that it is reasonable to withhold consent if
proposed replacement is not "ready, willing and able" to take over for alienating tenant);
Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 739 (Md. 1990) (giving examples of reasonable in-
stances of withholding consent, such as when the prospective tenant is financially irre-
sponsible or wants the property for a use for which it is not intended); cf. Kendall, 709
P.2d at 845 (considering also the reasonableness of a refusal of consent based on the
landlord's desire to charge a higher rent than provided for in the original lease).
76. It may be suggested that a tenant who alienates to take advantage of rental rates
higher than those called for in his lease will have to rent another space at current rates
and thus lose any extra money he might make on his sublease or assignment. This argu-
ment fails to consider situations such as a residential tenant who wants to move to a
smaller place or a commercial tenant who is relocating to a more affordable area or who
is going out of business and who needs a lot of cash. See Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc.
v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 719 & n.5 (Cal. 1992).
77. See supra Part II.
78. See supra notes 62--64 and accompanying text.
79. This Note assumes that acting in a matter that is illegal is per se unreasonable.
An example of illegal refusal of consent would be refusal based purely on the race of
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sonable because the intentions of the parties to restrain alienation
are clear.' When the consent clause is truly silent, the other jus-
tification for withholding consent comes into play, namely, that the
landlord should be able to protect his investment.8' The ultimate
questions when determining whether a refusal of consent pursuant
to a silent consent clause is reasonable, then, are whether the
landlord really is acting to protect his investment and, if so,
whether the importance of doing so outweighs the policies sup-
porting free alienation.
There are four types of situations in which a landlord might,
and often does, withhold consent using this justification. First, the
landlord may give no other reason whatsoever, arguing that he has
the right to be arbitrary or capricious because of the presence of
the consent clause.' With no evidence of threatened harm from
the transfer, the rationale of a need to protect one's investment is
baseless and simply unacceptable. 3
Second, a landlord may try to justify his actions by claiming
that there is a problem with a characteristic of the proposed sub-
stitute tenant.' In these cases, the withholding of consent on the
basis of the landlord's desire to protect his investment may be
reasonable, depending on whether consent is withheld because of
a characteristic, such as race or religion, that would have no direct
effect on the person's or entity's ability to be a model tenant, or
whether it is withheld because of a characteristic, such as history
of financial irresponsibility, that by its nature could directly affect
the person's or entity's ability to conform to the covenants in the
lease. As one court stated, when evaluating a prospective tenant, a
landlord must do so "using the same standards applied in the
the proposed sublessee or assignee. See supra note 52.
80. This principle holds unless duress or misrepresentation at the time of signing can
be shown. Such hazards are a possibility in any contract situation, however, and present
no additional problems with respect to lease contracts as compared to any other type of
contract.
81. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
82. See, eg., Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 190 N.E.2d 10, 11
(N.Y. 1963).
83. See supra note 59; see also Funk v. Funk, 633 P.2d 586, 589 (Idaho 1981)
("However, no desirable public policy is served by upholding a landlord's arbitrary refus-
al of consent merely because of whim or caprice .... ").
84. See, eg., Johnson v. Jaquith, 189 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Jack
Frost Sales v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Ill. Apo. Ct. 1982); Julian
v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 739 (Md. 1990).
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acceptance of the original lessee." Any time consent is withheld
in contravention of civil rights laws, then, the landlord's action is
per se unreasonable. It is more difficult to assess the question of
reasonableness when the discrimination is not necessarily illegal.'
In the balance, however, the right to discriminate, already legally
prohibited in many settings and thus on shaky policy ground any-
way, does not outweigh the policies supporting free alienation,
particularly the need for freedom of movement. 7 On the other
hand, if the basis for withholding consent is a characteristic that
would affect a prospective tenant's ability to perform his duties as
required by the lease, the landlord may be justified in refusing to
consent. Faced with a prospective tenant who, for example, has a
history of financial problems or who has been thrown out of
apartments in the past for excessive noise, a landlord is reasonable
if he worries that such a tenant will harm his investment. A tenant
who wishes to sublet or assign could hardly make a case that his
rights are being violated or that the landlord is being unreasonable
by withholding consent when the proposed new tenant is obviously
unsuitable and could do harm to the landlord financially or with
respect to his reputation for providing habitable and safe living
units or commercial space.
The third situation in which a landlord may decide to with-
hold consent is when he questions the use to which the proposed
substitute tenant is planning to put the premises. A tenant who
wishes to sublet or assign must present a suitable new tenant, and
if the new tenant wants to use the property in a way that violates
zoning laws, will pollute the surrounding area, or for which the
property is not equipped, even if there is no lease term explicitly
forbidding such use, the landlord is justified in withholding con-
sent. The threat to the investment is greater than the policies
supporting the tenant's freedom to alienate; the tenant is limited
only in that he must take a modicum of care when finding a sub-
lessee or assignee.
85. Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 277 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Shaker
Heights, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 1972 WL 20379 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1972), as
noted in F & L Ctr. Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984). Although this case was overruled, its reasoning is still sound. See infra
note 91 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 52.
87. See supra text accompanying note 45; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 105-06 (1971) (recognizing the constitutional right of interstate travel).
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Finally, a landlord might try to withhold consent to take ad-
vantage of a market in which rental rates are rising-i.e., the
landlord might refuse consent so that the tenant will forfeit the
lease and the landlord can then re-let the unit himself. In this
way, the landlord would receive the increase in rent instead of the
original tenant. Assuming a suitable substitute tenant has been put
forth, it is not reasonable for a landlord to withhold consent in
these situations under the guise of protecting his investment. If the
prospective tenant is suitable, the landlord's investment is not in
danger from the sublease or assignment. Instead of acting to pro-
tect his investment, the landlord who withholds consent and then
declares an alienated lease broken is trying to get more than his
bargained-for rent.' By agreeing to a lease for a certain time
period, a landlord has invested in such a way that he hopes he
has made a good deal regarding the amount of money he has put
into his investment compared to how much he will get in rent. If
the landlord has made a poor calculation, that is too bad. After
all, if market rates go down, adversely affecting the tenant's ability
to sublet for a higher rate than is in his lease, the tenant's only
recourse is to renegotiate the lease, an action the landlord will
probably refuse to take. The landlord has similarly bargained and
has promised the tenant the use of the premises as he sees fit for
the length of the lease term, as long as the tenant acts within the
law. In so doing, the landlord has bargained away any right to
take advantage of increased rental rates unless he adds specific
terms to the lease allowing for rent increases over time or rent
rate re-evaluation on a periodic basis. In a residential situation the
landlord who withholds consent seems especially unjustified be-
cause typically the landlord would not allow the original tenant to
bargain for the initial rent. Unlike the situation in which the ten-
ant must provide a substitute tenant who is equally as suitable as
the original tenant and the terms of the lease therefore are essen-
tially maintained, when the landlord insists on acquiring additional
rent for himself, the terms of the lease have been altered. Such an
88. See Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 845 (Cal. 1985) (en bane)
(noting that restraints may be allowed to protect property itself and to ensure perfor-
mance of lease covenants but not to obtain a "better bargain"); see also id. at 847-48
(recognizing that a landlord, by agreeing to a lease, has no claim to possible financial
benefits a tenant may gain by alienating the property during the term of the lease).
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alteration would be invalid because it would not involve additional
bargaining or consideration.
Examination of the situations in which a landlord is faced
with a decision concerning whether to consent to alienation leads
to the conclusion that a landlord can withhold consent reasonably
when confronted with a silent consent clause only when his invest-
ment is truly in danger of harm. If the landlord's justifications are
not based on possible misuse of the premises or characteristics of
-the proposed substitute lessee that could directly affect the lessee's
ability to be a suitable tenant, the withholding of consent is not
reasonable.
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF Two COURTS' APPROACHES
TO THE CONSENT CLAUSE PROBLEM
With the foregoing discussion in mind, it is informative to
look at the courts' treatment of the consent clause problem. Not
only are the state courts taking different paths, but within individ-
ual states, the message is not always clear as to what direction the
courts are currently pursuing or what justifications they will use to
support future decisions. If the law in this area is to become pre-
dictable in any given state, not to mention consistent among juris-
dictions, a uniform approach to the problem, such as the one
suggested in this Note, must be adopted. The decisions of an Ohio
court and of a California court illustrate the reigning confusion
and concomitant need for reform.
A. Cuyahoga County, Ohio
Although the highest state courts across the country did not
begin to support the minority position that silent consent clauses
have an inherent requirement of reasonableness until the late
1970s,89 a lower court in Ohio supported this position in 1971 in
Shaker Building Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co.' Although this
was only a municipal court decision, the highest courts of several
other states that later supported the reasonableness requirement
cited it in support of their own opinions.91 Furthermore, this case
89. See, eg., Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977).
90. 277 N.E.2d 584 (Shaker Heights, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 1972 WL 20379
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1972), as noted in F & L Ctr. Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores,
Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
91. Homa-Goff, 350 So. 2d at 1037; Kendall, 709 P.2d at 841; Funk v. Funk, 633
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and those decided in Cuyahoga County in its aftermath provide a
good example of a system in which the law regarding lease alien-
ation consent clauses is neither clear nor consistent.
In Shaker Building Co., a landlord sued a former tenant for
rent after the tenant vacated the premises. The tenant claimed
that the landlord should have accepted a proposed assignment to
another lessee who wanted to expand in the building in question.
Since the assignment had not been accepted, the tenant argued
that the landlord had failed to mitigate the damages incurred by
the vacating of the lease and that therefore no back rent was
owed. In defense, the landlord relied on a clause in the lease
agreement that provided that the lessee could not assign the lease
without the landlord's consent. 2 In finding for the defendant, the
court held that the lease, having been prepared by the landlord,
should be construed when ambiguous strictly against the landlord.
Interpreting the clause in light of this principle, the court held that
inherent in the consent clause was "representation that an assign-
ment [was] possible"' and that if the landlord wanted the right
to withhold consent either reasonably or unreasonably, he should
have so stated clearly in the lease. The court went on to say that
consent could not be withheld unless the landlord's reason related
to the unacceptability of the prospective tenant. 4
After Shaker Building Co., reasonableness in silent consent
clauses would seem to have been the law, at least in Cuyahoga
County. This was not the case because the decision was soon
overturned.95 Because the overturning opinion was not published,
however, the reasoning of the earlier decision was still relied on
by some courts outside Ohio.96 Nonetheless, in F & L Center v.
Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc.,' the opinion that revealed that
Shaker Building Co. had been overturned, the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals publicly rejoined the majority of states in sup-
P.2d 586, 589 (Idaho 1981); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (N.M.
1982).
92. Shaker Bldg. Co., 277 N.E.2d at 585.
93. Id. at 587.
94. Id
95. See 1972 WL 20379 (Ohio CL App. Mar. 2, 1972). This decision was not report-
ed but was noted by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals in F & L Ctr. Co. v.
Cunningham Drug Stores, 482 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), twelve years
later.
96. See supra note 91.
97. 482 N.E2d 1296 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
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porting the idea that consent could be withheld arbitrarily when a
lease's consent clause made no express mention of reasonable-
ness.
98
The law in Cuyahoga County still seems less than settled,
however, due to the opinions of one of its appellate judges, Judge
Nahra. In his dissent in F & L Center, Judge Nahra cited the
cases supporting the minority position, which requires reasonable-
ness in lease alienation clauses, discussing at some length the
argument that the contract law standard of good faith and fair
dealing implied a standard of "commercial reasonableness." He
echoed the Shaker Building Co. opinion in holding that consent
may be withheld only if the tenant proposed by the alienating
lessee would be unacceptable."
Obviously, Judge Nahra's arguments on the subject are not
law since they arose in a dissenting opinion, but there is a further
indication that the court in Cuyahoga County might adopt his
reasoning. A few years after F & L Center, then-Chief Judge
Nahra wrote the opinion in Sherman v. Carlin." That case, in
which the consent clause was only a tangential issue, involved a
decedent's representative who argued that the lease provided that
only the decedent could occupy the premises and that it thus
terminated at the time of death. Chief Judge Nahra stated that the
clause in the lease that required the consent of the landlord to
assign was not evidence that the decedent would be the only per-
son bound as lessee because "[t]he clause does not prohibit assign-
ment, but only requires the landlord's prior approval. This provi-
sion ... acted only to ensure that the tenant's obligations would
be performed by [the decedent] or by someone acceptable to the
landlord. 10 1
Whether this position will prevail the next time the silent
consent clause issue is raised in the Cuyahoga County courts re-
mains to be seen. F & L Center was neither distinguished nor
98. Id. at 1300. The court also mentioned that another clause in the lease at issue,
which dealt with major structural changes to the property, did provide that consent could
not be unreasonably withheld and that the parties thus could have used the same lan-
guage with regard to the alienation clause. The court did not rely on this reasoning,
however (although it would have been justified in so doing), but instead noted that it
made this observation "in passing." Id.
99. Id. at 1300-01 (Nahra, J., dissenting).
100. 546 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
101. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
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mentioned in the Sherman opinion, but the language Judge Nahra
used in this later opinion resembled the language he used in his
dissent in the earlier case. Thus, although F & L Center is still
good law, conflicting attitudes are apparent in the caselaw.
B. California
The situation in California is quite different from the one in
Ohio because the California Supreme Court has consistently up-
held the reading of the reasonableness concept into unadorned
consent clauses."° Nonetheless, the California decisions have not
drawn a clear picture of the issue; instead, they have required
analysis of the reasonableness of parties' actions not only with
regard to silent clause cases but also in cases in which such analy-
sis should not be undertaken.
The leading silent consent clause case in California is Kendall
v. Ernest Pestana, Inc."13 In Kendall, the plaintiffs attempted to
take an assignment of a lease of hangar space at an airport but
were prevented from doing so by the defendant lessor. The defen-
dant argued that under the lease's consent clause, which had no
provision for reasonableness, he could withhold consent arbitrarily
or to impose higher rent on the proposed assignees. 4 The court
sided with the plaintiffs and the minority of states, holding that
reasonableness of consent was required and that withholding con-
sent to get higher rent that had not been bargained for was not
reasonable. 5 This opinion, in that it supported its holding with
arguments based on freedom of alienation and the standard of
good faith imposed on all contracts, is sound. In fact, the court in
this case even recognized that generally, parties are free to agree
explicitly to restraints on alienation,"° supporting its ruling by
noting that the particular consent clause under consideration did
not explicitly restrain alienation but rather was ambiguous and
thus required a reasonableness inquiry.
102. See supra Section II(A). It should be noted that even in cases in which due-on-
sale clauses were at issue, the California Supreme Court, in Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am.,
582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978) (en banc), required that reasonableness be read into the mort-
gage contracts.
103. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (en bane).
104. Id. at 840.
105. Id. at 845.
106. Id. at 844 n.14 (acknowledging that freely negotiated clauses giving absolute dis-
cretion over alienation to the landlord may be valid).
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Had there been no cases after Kendall concerning consent
clauses in leases, California's approach to the reasonableness issue
would be quite clear. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court
was faced with another consent clause case when it was called on
to decide Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Devel-
opment California, Inc." In this case, the lease in question con-
tained two alienation clauses. The first explicitly stated that con-
sent could not be unreasonably withheld. This clause was accom-
panied by a companion clause that allowed the landlord to termi-
nate the lease on notice of the tenant's intention to sublet or
assign. The accompanying provision further allowed the landlord
to enter into a new lease with the prospective lessee who had
been proposed by the original tenant."° When Carma Develop-
ers did try to sublet, their landlord, Marathon Development,
promptly terminated the lease. Carma sued on the basis of breach
of contract and violation of the implied covenant of good faith,
and the lower court held that the clause that made no mention of
reasonableness-the companion clause-should be read as if it
had.'O
On appeal, the California Supreme Court correctly held that
the lease was not ambiguous since it explicitly stated its terms. It
was therefore not analogous to the lease in the Kendall case and
did not require any reading of reasonableness into the second
provision to augment the requirement in the consent clause.""
Instead, the court held that the clauses gave the landlord two
options when presented with the possibility that the tenant might
sublet or assign: the landlord could either terminate the lease,
thereby releasing the tenant from all remaining obligations, or the
landlord could decide not to terminate, in which case it could not
unreasonably withhold consent to alienation.' The court further
held that since the landlord acted within the express provisions of
the lease, it had not violated the doctrine of good faith."1
Had the court stopped at this point, the issue would have
been settled. Regrettably, the court had more to say on the mat-
ter. Although acting within the express terms of a contract is
107. 826 P.2d 710 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
108. Id. at 713.
109. Id. at 712.
110. Id. at 714.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 729.
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inherently reasonable and clearly not an abridgement of the good-
faith doctrine, n 3 the court performed the balancing test advocat-
ed in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,"4 an earlier due-on-sale
clause case.' This test, similar to the one used in Part III of
this Note,"6 requires a balancing of the justifications for a re-
straint against the effect of the restraint on alienation."7 Using
this test, the court found the restraint at issue to be reasonable
because it was limited to the duration of the lease, included a
forfeiture clause that released the tenant from obligation, and
would be invoked, supposedly, only in a rising market because a
landlord would not terminate the lease to re-rent if he could not
get more money for doing so."'
This analysis turns the whole opinion on its head. Without
this analysis, the opinion suggests, soundly, that whenever the
lease is explicit, it is out of the realm of the silent consent clause
analysis of reasonableness because all actions explicitly allowed for
by the lease are inherently reasonable. With the addition of this
analysis, however, the opinion implies that even when two parties
explicitly lay out what is or is not reasonable, the court may disre-
gard their contract and impose its own determination of reason-
ableness. Thus, even in cases in which parties have sought to
avoid the silent consent clause debate altogether by being explicit,
the court could change the terms of their contract. In a sense, the
California court has announced that it will scrutinize all consent
clauses as if they were silent consent clauses, regardless of the
expressed intent of the parties involved.
Because the California Supreme Court has implied that it will
look for reasonableness no matter what the situation, even when it
is not required by the nature of the contract involved and even
113. The court obviously could not hold that the defendant had acted in bad faith for
doing exactly what the contract said it could do. See supra text accompanying notes
62-64.
114. 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978) (en banc).
115. Canna, 826 P.2d at 716; see Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d at 973.
116. The fact that a similar test was used in a due-on-sale clause case is irrelevant.
The problem with those cases that advocated reading reasonableness into due-on-sale
clauses was not the particular balancing test used to determine what was reasonable, but
rather that any balancing was done at all. See supra Section 1(A). Thus, although a
balancing test is valid for determining reasonableness, its use should be confined to cases
in which there actually are unadorned consent clauses. Carma was not such a case.
117. Carma, 826 P.2d at 716-17 (citing Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d at 973).
118. Id at 719.
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when what is reasonable has already been explicitly defined, states
following the majority rule in silent consent clause cases may be
loathe to follow California's lead in adopting the minority opinion.
After all, the California Supreme Court's approach is confusing, at
times inconsistent, and, as a result, hard to apply. Thus, states
following the majority rule, despite their faulty reasoning, may
continue to eschew the invocation of reasonableness into silent
consent clauses simply because such an approach seems less diffi-
cult. This result would be unfortunate, particularly because the
minority approach, when used correctly, is not complicated, as
illustrated by the test proposed in this Note.
V. CONCLUSION
Although silent consent clauses seem innocuous in that they
merely require a tenant who wants to sublet or assign his lease to
ask the landlord before doing so, they have spawned decades of
debate among and within states. Due to their pervasiveness, they
will continue to promote confusion if state courts or legislatures
do not take action to promote uniform treatment.119
The best way to promote such uniformity would be to require
the reading of reasonableness into all silent consent clauses. Anal-
ysis of the concept of freedom of alienation, as well as generally
accepted contract interpretation principles, demonstrates that both
real property and contract laws support this approach. In addition,
such an approach would end the confusion of state courts that are
currently unable to articulate a clear preference for one view over
the other.
Unfortunately, unlike the due-on-sale clause problem that
involved the activities of institutional lenders that could be re-
solved by Congress under federal banking laws, the silent consent
clause problem concerns property and contract law issues tradi-
tionally reserved to the states. Therefore, it is the responsibility of
the state courts (or legislatures) to look beyond both the en-
trenched majority rule and the confusing attempts by some courts
to adopt the minority rule to the basic rules of real property law
and contract interpretation. The states can then adopt a uniform,
119. See, eg., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.005 (West 1984) (prohibiting tenants from
subletting without landlord's consent; Young v. De La Garza, 368 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963) (noting that TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5237 (the statutory precursor to
§ 91.005) "is made a part of every lease contract [in Texas] by operation of law").
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stable rule of silent consent clause application based on the con-
cept of reasonableness.

